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The Legal Person and its Other: A Comparative View on 
Drawing and Effacing Boundaries in Various Cultural 
Contexts 
_Abstract 
Focusing on the project of “de-humanizing law” calls for a discussion of the concept 
of the legal person for two reasons. Firstly, legal processes of personification have at 
times gone beyond the anthropocentric bias in legal thinking; secondly, the definition 
of personhood has often brought about de-humanizing results. By scrutinizing various 
culturally and historically dependent drawings of the boundaries of personification, it 
can be shown that the presumed equivalence between legal persons and humans does 
not hold. This can be illustrated through an analysis of legal personification of animals 
as well as some recent legal attempts to attribute personality to nature. In contrast to 
these inclusionary processes of personification, there have always also been efforts to 
deny certain human beings the status of legal persons. Despite becoming more inclu-
sive historically, modern law does not eschew with creating abnormal non-persons 
(beasts, monsters, dangerous beings, etc.) in order to underline the construction of 
individual/rational attribution and accountability. Defining legal personhood not only 
implies a differentiation between persons and non-persons, but, especially in the 
Western world, between persons and things. Whereas bio-political issues have some-
what challenged this division, there are examples showing that in some contexts this 
division was never made clearly in the first place. Finally, the analysis of problems 
that current international copyright law faces when dealing with questions of tradi-
tional knowledge and cultural heritage reveals the occidental bias concerning the con-
ception of personhood, namely its link to an individualized image of the ingenious 
author. 
1_Introduction 
The project of “de-humanizing law” ties in with the growing corpus of posthumanist 
theories that challenge liberal, humanist, and Enlightenment models of selfhood and 
rationality in very heterogeneous manners and with diverging normative implications1 
— models that are suspected to form the basis of Western law as well. The critical 
project of posthumanism involves questioning the divides between humans and nature, 
reason and unreason, mind and body, culture and nature, human life and the world of 
things and technology. This project calls for a discussion of the concept of the legal 
person for two reasons. Firstly, a historical view as well as a comparative look at cur-
rent legal-cultural practices and ideas reveal that legal processes of personification have 
at times gone beyond the anthropocentric bias in legal thinking (or, as a downside, have 
induced the anthropomorphic representation of the non-human world); secondly, the 
definition of personhood, which is one of the foundations of legal systems, has often 
brought about de-humanizing results in violent and exclusionary ways. Scrutinizing the 
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various culturally and historically dependent drawings of the boundaries of personifi-
cation provides ample evidence for the contingency and cultural diversity of legal prac-
tices and narratives as well as for Ngaire Naffine’s claim that “the greatest political act 
of law is the making of a legal person.”2 
Aside from cultural presuppositions and political struggles, the never-ending con-
troversy about law’s ‘population’ is kept alive by the persistence of conflicting per-
spectives on the nature of law in general. From a moral philosophical point of view, 
the concept of the legal person is closely linked to ideas about human dignity that reveal 
normative assumptions. This view stands in contrast to a positivist account of law, in 
which a legal person operates as a functional unit within a given legal system. Irrespec-
tive of the concrete form of a legal order, the involvement of legal persons is essential 
for legal proceedings to take place. The legal concept of personhood ascribes rights and 
duties and entails certain modes of causality, responsibility and attribution of action to 
actors, which are, however,  
mere constructs, semantic artifacts produced by the legal discourse itself. […] The 
densely populated world of legal persons, the plaintiffs and defendants, the judges 
and legislators, the parties to a contract, the corporations and the state, is an inter-
nal invention of the legal process.3 
The term “invention” refers to the self-referentiality and the epistemic dimension of 
law, which constitutes its own objects as legal objects.4 This holds true for the concept 
of the legal person in general. While legal orders often discriminate between natural 
and legal persons, i.e., between human individuals, on the one hand, and corporations 
and other collective actors on the other, systems theorists such as Michael Hutter and 
Gunther Teubner describe both entities as “semantic fictions.”5 To be sure, this is not 
the exclusive insight of systems theory. Commenting on the debate about the ontolog-
ical status of natural and legal persons, which has been ongoing since the nineteenth 
century, the Neo-Kantian philosopher Gustav Radbruch remarked concisely: 
Being a person results from an act of personification by the legal order. All per-
sons, the physical ones as well as the legal ones, are creations of the legal order. 
Thus, in the strictest sense, physical persons are “legal persons.” Hence, there can-
not be an argument about the “fictive,” i.e., artificial nature of any person, be it 
physical or legal.6  
While Radbruch considered the problem of persons’ “meta-juridical substrate” worthy 
of debate, he focused on the question of whether there was a “pre-legal essence”7 lurk-
ing behind those collective agents recognized as legal persons. Yet it was self-evident 
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to him that “behind any physical person, there is a human being,”8 which is a highly 
problematic assumption, at least at second glance. The genealogy of the concept of the 
person as well as current debates are far from suggesting the simple identification of 
persons as human beings, which can be illustrated by a short look at the personification 
of animals (2). Furthermore, some indigenous groups’ struggles for recognition have 
recently led to the legal solution that in several cases nature is treated as a legal person 
as well (3). In contrast to these inclusionary processes of personification, there have 
always been efforts to deny certain human beings the status of legal persons: women, 
slaves, Jews and many other groups. Moreover, it can be shown that, despite having 
generally become more inclusive historically, modern law does not eschew with creat-
ing abnormal non-persons (beasts, monsters, dangerous beings, etc.) in order to under-
line the construction of individual/rational accountability (4). Defining legal person-
hood, however, does not only imply a differentiation between persons and non-persons. 
Especially in the Western world, the differentiation is also between persons and things 
— the summa divisio (highest division) of Western legal cultures (Alain Supiot). 
Whereas bio-political and bio-ethical debates meanwhile have challenged this division, 
there are also examples showing that in some contexts this division was never made 
clearly in the first place (5). Finally, the analysis of current problems that international 
copyright law faces when dealing with questions of traditional knowledge and cultural 
heritage reveals another occidental bias concerning personhood, namely, the link that 
is made between personhood and an individualized image of the ingenious author (6). 
2_From Animal Trials to Zoopolis: The Human-Animal-Divide in Historical Per-
spective 
European legal history provides a plethora of cases in which the status of a person was 
ascribed to non-humans. As Walter Hyde has shown,9 trials against animals and inani-
mate objects seem to have been part of the normative order in ancient Greece. Despite 
the lack of trial records, Hyde has collected many classical sources (including Aristotle) 
that refer to the institution of the Prytaneion. This was the Hotel de Ville of every Greek 
city, serving inter alia as a law court that dealt with three rather curious kinds of murder 
cases: firstly, unknown murderers or those who could not be found were nevertheless 
tried at the court; secondly, inanimate objects that had accidently caused the death of a 
human being were put on trial, e.g., stones or iron bars; and thirdly, animals that had 
killed a person were tried as well. Extending the group of accountable ‘persons’ in these 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 3 (2017): Law Undone 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2017/12997/ 
5 
cases may have been due to the metaphysical assumption that moral responsibility was 
not limited to human beings.10 According to Hyde, however, what was much more im-
portant was the Greeks’  
general notion that the moral equilibrium of the community had been disturbed by 
the murder and that somebody or something must be punished or else dire misfor-
tune, in the form of plagues, droughts, and reverses in men’s fortunes, would over-
take the land. So the ideal legislation of Plato on this point was based upon the 
same idea which was at the bottom of all the murder laws of Athens, — that the 
Erinys or avenging spirit of the dead man must be appeased.11  
Thus, what seems peculiar from a modern perspective can be understood as a ritual of 
purification: the court proceedings had a symbolic function that remains present in an 
allegedly disenchanted modernity, too.12  
More prominent than these trials was the punishment of animals in Europe from the 
thirteenth century onwards, a practice that extended into the Modern Age.13 Vermin 
such as mice, rats or grasshoppers, which had eaten the crops of a village or had done 
similar damage, were tried before ecclesiastical tribunals, and were often excommuni-
cated. Secular courts, on the other hand, punished pets or farm animals that had killed 
or injured humans. All of these trials rigorously respected the ordinary procedural rules 
applied in legal proceedings against humans: the animals were delivered a summons to 
appear in court, or, this message was proclaimed publicly at the assumed whereabouts 
of the defendants. They were served notice of the concrete accusation, were assigned a 
counsel, and, if convicted of murder, were executed like their human counterparts ac-
cording to lex talionis. Animals were not objects but legal subjects, who were accred-
ited with reason and freedom of will and hence also with being animated by motives, 
not instincts. The killing of the animals subsequent to their trials represented more an 
act of criminalization than an expression of revenge because it was based on the as-
sumption that the accused animals were legally responsible. 
Peter Dinzelbacher has suggested two explanations for this from a contemporary 
perspective strange legal practice.14 Firstly, cultural representations of the analogy of 
human beings and animals proliferated in the High Middle Ages, e.g., in the epics of 
Reynard the Fox. Thus, animals were no longer regarded as simple beasts but were 
thought of in an anthropomorphizing way, greatly contrasting Christian antiquity and 
the Early Middle Ages when the boundaries between the two species, man and beast, 
were drawn very sharply. Secondly, the personification of animals can be understood 
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as a striking element of the larger enterprise to regulate all segments of everyday life 
through law. This totalizing endeavor makes the juridification of the modern world 
criticized by Jürgen Habermas15 and others appear rather harmless. Anthropomorphiz-
ing irresponsible creatures served to make their behaviors legally commensurable and 
expressed the fierce will of secular and religious authorities to assert their rule in a 
disciplining manner.16 All these facets resulted in “fantasies of legal omnipotence”17 
most likely unparalleled in other parts of the world. 
In current debates about animal rights, analogies between animals and human beings 
have again been brought forward: this time, however, they are not motivated by disci-
plining rationalities but by ethical considerations. The increasing awareness of animals’ 
sensitivity and capacity for suffering signals a break with the Cartesian tradition of 
considering animals insensitive machines, and also with the refusal to increase their 
legal status above being a thing, a piece of property.18 This awareness has fueled the 
struggle of activists and scientists who long to see certain animals granted subjective 
fundamental rights. This struggle for recognition has resulted, so far, in legal acts of 
partial personification, as the right of animals to have basic rights does not go in hand 
with full legal capacity in the sense of accountability.19 For some theorists, however, 
this partial personification does not suffice, which has resulted in recent demands to 
consistently regard “animals as persons.”20 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka even go 
so far as to plea for the attribution of citizenship to domesticated animals, for a zoopolis 
that revises categories of political membership and political action, thereby suppressing 
the boundaries between animals and human beings.21 While being critical of the notion 
of ‘personhood’ in general, and lamenting its cognitivist bias,22 they opt for a funda-
mental rights approach towards animals insofar as they should “have inviolable rights 
in virtue of their sentience or selfhood, the fact that they have a subjective experience 
of the world.”23 One important consequence of this alternative view is that animals 
would, on the one hand, be granted not just certain negative rights but also positive 
ones such as the right to be politically represented, given the fact that the direct voting 
is not feasible; on the other hand, in a rather communitarian tradition, the authors dis-
cuss the moral obligations of these new co-citizens, e.g., the duty of domesticated ani-
mals to stick to a vegan diet.24  
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Radical theorists of posthumanism such as Rosi Braidotti view large parts of the 
animal rights movement ambivalently. While Braidotti praises the movement’s ambi-
tion to overcome “anthropolatry,” she criticizes its reliance on a humanist apparatus of 
conceptions and values.25 “Western philosophy’s anthropological machine,” the polit-
ical implications of which Giorgio Agamben has revealed,26 is hard to overcome. 
3_The Personification of Nature 
While this short historical overview of the development of the human-animal constel-
lation highlights not only the moral, but also the political ideas and ideologies that are 
involved in legal personification, far-reaching cultural differences have come to the 
fore in recent ecocentric initiatives. While the constitutional guarantee of the protection 
and conservation of nature is relatively far-spread, there are some projects, especially 
in Latin America, that aim to go even further. As early as 1972, Christopher D. Stone 
asked the often-quoted question “Should trees have standing?”27 — a thought-provok-
ing approach that has been answered affirmatively during the last couple of years. 
The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution does not content itself with celebrating Pacha 
Mama (Mother Earth) in the preamble, but makes it clear in Articles 71 and 72 that 
Pacha Mama is a legal subject that has “the right to integral respect for its existence 
and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and 
evolutionary processes” as well as “the right to be restored.”28 Similarly, the Bolivian 
parliament passed the “Law of the Rights of Mother Earth” in 2010, recognizing nature 
as a legal person, too. While being embedded in a larger political counter-project 
against neo-liberalism and colonial history, these innovative efforts to overcome an-
thropocentrism in a legal context can be explained by the increasing recognition of 
indigenous cultures in Latin America.29 The people of the Andes revere the Goddess 
Pacha Mama in their cosmological narratives as the benign source of fertility, which 
means that there is a pre-legal personification preceding the recognition of Pacha 
Mama as a legal subject.  
In New Zealand, a related case can be found. In 2011, a Maori tribe (Iwi) and the 
government made an agreement that established legal personhood for the Wanganui 
River in order to guarantee its health and well-being. The local tribes regard the river 
as sacred — part of a whole river system with various physical and metaphysical ele-
ments that are viewed as a living entity.30 Thus, most of these innovative practices of 
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personifying nature stem from pressure on the part of indigenous communities and their 
supporters. The fact that the City of Pittsburgh adopted an ordinance in 2010 banning 
corporations from natural gas drilling in the city by explicitly subordinating the rights 
of corporations to the rights of the people, the community, and nature31 may signal that 
there is a more general legal-conceptual evolution under way. In any case, these legal 
decisions help to irritate in a productive way all those, especially Western, anthropo-
centric conceptual schemes in which ‘personhood’ is tied to rationality and individual-
ism. 
4_The Legal Rationality of (De-)Personification: Human Dignity and the Specter 
of Beastly Non-Persons 
In contrast to these recent efforts to forge a more inclusive concept of personification 
that extends beyond the human community, a large part of legal history has been shaped 
by the opposite dynamics, namely the decision to deny certain human beings the status 
of legal persons. While there is a non-teleological general development towards a more 
inclusive understanding of legal personhood, the infamous War on Terror and the re-
lated security paradigm have been implemented using practices of de-personification. 
Moreover, as will be shown, the production of non-persons is central to the very func-
tioning of modern law. 
As a normative concept of legal dogmatics and system building, the legal person is 
a kind of “concentrate of historical long-term developments,”32 which cannot be un-
derstood through a focus on legal discussions alone. John Dewey justified the venturing 
of non-lawyers into the field of legal personality by emphasizing “that discussions and 
theories which have influenced legal practice have, with respect to the concept of ‘per-
son,’ introduced and depended upon a mass of non-legal considerations: considerations 
popular, historical, political, moral, philosophical, metaphysical, and, in connection 
with the latter, theological.”33 
The ‘invention’ of legal persons by given legal systems that was discussed at the 
beginning of this article should not be taken as a creatio ex nihilo but as a legal opera-
tion drawing upon a rich, often extra-legal “distillate of cultural history.”34 Roman pri-
vate law already registered the concept of the person without conceiving of it in a le-
gally technical way. Being largely congruent with the term “human being,” the concept 
was not yet linked to the legal logic of inclusion and exclusion that pervades the modern 
use of the word. Thus, for the Romans, it was not a contradiction to regard slaves as 
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persons, as the social position of a person was marked by status. Whether someone — 
a man in this case — had legal capacity, i.e., was treated as having rights and duties, 
depended on the question of whether he belonged to the group of the free (liberi) or 
slaves (servi), to the citizens (cives) or strangers (perigrini), and on his status familiae, 
from the pater familias to the servus working in the household.35 
Therefore, this antique conceptualization of personhood differs crucially from mod-
ern legal thought. Not only are rights and duties attributed through the status of legal 
personhood in modern legal conceptualizations, but personhood has been animated by 
experiences and cultural reflections of violence and injustice36 that make the “sacred-
ness of the person”37 a fundament of civilization. Emile Durkheim described the pro-
cess of rendering personhood sacred in the context of the Dreyfus Affair at the end of 
the nineteenth century.38 
Christian theology is often taken to be a precursor to this process of sacralization 
through its transferring the “metaphysical dignity of the divine person”39 to the human 
being. In the early sixth century, Boethius’ definition of the person as “naturae ration-
abilis individua substantia” (an individual substance of a rational nature) was ground-
breaking in applying the concept of ‘person’ to humans.40 However, it was in thirteenth-
century scholasticism, and especially in the work of Alexander of Hales and Thomas 
Aquinas, that rational capacity was systematically interwoven with the attributes of 
freedom and dignity, determining the occidental use of ‘person’ to this day.41 Francisco 
Súarez made use of natural law constructions to conceive of all human beings as per-
sonae morales who were invested with universal subjective rights. In the context of 
colonialism, regarding human beings as legal persons was a revolutionary position.42  
This re-conceptualization of legal personality and rights was further refined when 
humans came to be considered as the source of validity of their own rights, most nota-
bly in enlightenment philosophy’s autonomy doctrine, which is directed at the rational 
self-subjection of individuals to moral laws. Niklas Luhmann has shown how the mean-
ing of ‘subjective rights’ has changed accordingly. A person is no longer just the ad-
dressee and passive bearer of rights, as the medieval term subjectum iuris suggests but 
also their author. The Cartesian revolution and the subsequent developments of subject 
philosophy entail the turn to the validation and legitimation of law in a subjective and 
self-referential fashion.43 
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Thus, Immanuel Kant equates human with person and legal person by tying legal 
rights and obligations to the moral essence of all humans. Thereby he upholds and fur-
ther develops the traditional distinction between rational and self-contained persons, 
on the one hand, and mere things, on the other hand, which will be discussed in the 
following section. Kant’s definition of “person” in the Metaphysics of Morals, assigns 
the status to “a subject whose actions can be imputed to him,”44 while not yet making 
the link between rights and obligations and personhood explicit. The imputation of ac-
tions, however, is closely linked to the idea of autonomy, i.e., self-rule of the moral 
person, “the freedom of a rational being under moral laws.”45 A person’s rational and 
moral capacity for self-rule conditions her dignity, which entails the right to be re-
spected by others: “Every man has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow men 
and is in turn bound to respect every other.”46 As this respect is directed towards “the 
dignity of humanity in every other man,”47 the fusion of the human, the person, and the 
legal person is complete. 
At the end of the sixteenth century, when ‘person’ was introduced as a systematic 
legal concept for the first time, this equation was not yet clear. While Hugo Doneau 
(Donellus) identified all those subjects participating in legal actions as persons, he re-
mained in the tradition of Roman law’s conception of status, which assigned a person’s 
social position. The emphasis on social stratification dominated private law debates up 
until the eighteenth century, although it was increasingly confronted by the natural law 
focus on egalitarianism.48 But even in Kant there is much to be learned about the fra-
gility of the crucial identification of the human being and the legal person. According 
to him, some humans lose their status as a person by committing a “crime against hu-
manity as such.”49 While rape and pederasty should be punished by castration, accord-
ing to him, “bestiality” results in “permanent expulsion from civil society.”50 Rousseau 
was even more radical when he made it clear that each person’s violation of the social 
contract was to be answered by, at least, exiling the culprit and, in especially grave 
instances, executing him: through their deeds, criminals lose their status as a respecta-
ble person (personne morale) and become public enemies.51 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny adopted Kantian morality in his legal thinking, stating 
that “the original concept of the person or the legal subject has to cohere with the con-
cept of the human being.”52 Savigny was quick to modify this assertion by pointing to 
the fact that some humans can be designated as being without legal capacity 
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(Rechtsfähigkeit), and legal capacity can be attributed to more than just single human 
beings.53 The second modification paved the way for the juridical concept of the person 
that is detached from the question of human morality, making legal capacity a key in-
strument in legal operations.54 The first modification, which is directed at the denial of 
legal capacity, underlines, as in Kant’s conceptualization, the potential of exclusion 
and inclusion with which the concept of the person is endowed. It always runs the risk 
of being haunted by its ‘other’: “Browsing the archives, the demarcation between per-
sons and non-persons proves to be historically variable, up to the point at which the 
distinction becomes blurred and non-persons (Unpersonen) are treading the stage of 
law.”55  
The historical list of human beings who have been partially or entirely denied the 
status of a legal person is long: slaves, African Americans, members of indigenous 
groups, women, but also Jews and other minorities persecuted by the Nazi regime.56 In 
1935, Karl Larenz, suggested getting rid of the primacy of subjective rights in favor of 
the ‘objective’ law of National Socialism. Larenz, it should be remembered, was a no-
torious Nazi jurist who nevertheless was allowed to enjoy a considerable academic ca-
reer in the Federal German Republic after the war. He consistently underlined the duties 
of the “Rechtsgenossen” (the subjects of the legal order) who were only considered 
legal persons if they were “Volksgenossen” (people of German lineage, i.e., of ‘correct’ 
racial descent). All those who did not qualify for this status were assigned a position 
outside the law.57 
In response to these horrible reinterpretations of legal personhood, German Basic 
Law emphasizes the inviolable freedom of each person and the “right to free develop-
ment of his personality” in Article 2. The strengthening of the ethical content of the 
concept of the person in German constitutional law and beyond, however, has not pre-
vented attempts to create new non-persons or even anti-persons of law. This came to 
the fore in recent debates about preventive custody or the legal status of “unlawful 
enemy combatants,” a legal category that was originally coined in 1942 by the U.S. 
Supreme Court and was then revitalized in the context of the so-called War on Terror 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in order to deny detainees vital procedural rights:  
The U.S. legal approach in the “war on terror” has, to a large degree, shifted from 
what criminal law theorists have called a “criminal law for citizens” to a “criminal 
law for enemies.” While the “criminal law for citizens” treats its addressees as 
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law-abiding persons, the “criminal law for enemies” treats its subjects as “danger-
ous individuals” who cannot be convinced but only forced into submission to the 
law. The U.S. approach to the “war on terror,” however, ventures beyond the 
“criminal law for enemies” period by placing the “enemy combatant” beyond the 
law: criminal law becomes a moot point where detention is solely based on a per-
son’s alleged dangerousness. In this process, the “enemy combatants” are stripped 
not only of rights but also of their legal personality that is the basis for having 
rights.58 
But there is also an ongoing controversy in German legal theory about the necessity of 
special legal treatment for dangerous individuals under the label of Feindstrafrecht 
(criminal law of the enemy). Penologist Günther Jakobs not only acknowledges law’s 
capacity for de-personification, but largely affirms it when he speaks of the fight 
(“Bekämpfung”) against individuals “who have turned away permanently or at least 
with a certain insistence from law, in other words: who do not provide the minimum of 
cognitive guarantee that is indispensable for being treated as a legal person.”59 Jakobs 
is even more explicitly punitive when discussing the detention of criminals whose risk 
of relapse is calculated as high, arguing that in those cases “the control of a source of 
danger and not the treatment of a person is at stake, as with a wild animal.”60 Such 
justifications for depriving certain individuals of their legal personality suggest accept-
ing what Kant called “bestiality” in a comprehensive sense as the constitutive other of 
legal personality.61 In this regard, modern law is a reflection of Western philosophy, 
according to which “the human being is considered to be a composite of rationality and 
animality, classifiable as a person only to the extent that it is able to dominate the ani-
mal that dwells inside it.”62 Many legal systems rest on distinguishing between ‘nor-
mal,’ accountable, and rational legal subjects and ‘abnormal’ non-persons; this renders 
a re-reading of Michel Foucault’s lectures on the Abnormal profitable, especially his 
analyses of the historical discourses on monstrosity.63 Furthermore, cultural represen-
tations of this other side of legal personality play a part in practices of de-personifica-
tion and de-humanization.64  
5_Persons and Things: The Fragility of the Western Summa Divisio 
Current debates about which humans should be recognized as legal persons have be-
come even more controversial in light of diverging opinions about human nature. Dur-
ing the last thirty years, biopolitical and bioethical debates about the possible scope of 
technological reproduction and the beginning and end of human life have made the 
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concept of the human appear porous.65 This has destabilized the equation between hu-
man beings and legal persons and has raised normative questions that defy unanimous 
answers. Given the fierce struggle about fundamental values that is at stake here and 
which is often animated by religious and traditional convictions, this is hardly surpris-
ing. Moreover, pragmatic legal solutions are often not at hand when traditional catego-
ries and concepts are found to no longer apply.66 Embryos, for instance, are attributed 
with legal personhood in many legal cultures. Thereby certain subjective rights (e.g., 
in heritage issues) are ignored, and legal capacity is denied to the embryo in private 
law matters; hence, in these cases, there is a recognition of an at least gradual prenatal 
legal personality. The status of embryonic stem cells has proven even more controver-
sial from a legal as well as a societal perspective. In this case, delicate moral reflections 
need to be made about the bearer of personality and dignity, about personal identity, 
potential persons and the like.67 The aforementioned sacredness of the person surfaces 
again in a highly sensitive setting, as Roberto Esposito has argued, because “[o]nly a 
life that has crossed beforehand through the symbolic door of the person is believed to 
be sacred or is to be valued in terms of its qualities […].”68 
Biopolitical debates concerning the boundaries of personality and the ‘human’ touch 
on one of the pillars of occidental legal culture in a sensitive way. In his anthropological 
exploration of the homo juridicus, Alain Supiot has shown that the systematic distinc-
tion between persons and things is a summa divisio (the highest division) that not only 
pervades Western legal thought but also the whole perspective on the social world. 
According to Supiot, whereas it is evident that treating persons as things amounts to a 
sacrilege, to treat things as persons has to be viewed as irrational.69 One core trait of 
Marxist and neo-Marxist theories, which heavily influenced other critical approaches, 
consists in deciphering social practices that reify subjects.70 This criticism ties in with 
the Kantian concept, according to which the respect of the autonomous person ulti-
mately relies on the essential differentiation of persons and things.71 Yet the summa 
divisio Supiot analyzes, proves fragile when not just the reification of persons (who are 
often taken as a given) is considered but also the very boundaries between persons and 
things. From which point on does a cell cluster count as a human being and not as mere 
matter or biomass? Which status do we confer to “potential persons” like frozen em-
bryos?72 Moreover, does the summa divisio become obsolete when we pay tribute to 
the fact that 
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the increasing recognition that each human body or individual is potentially either 
person or thing brings with it an awareness that techniques of personification and 
reification are constitutive rather than declaratory of the ontology upon which they 
are based[?]73 
Leaving bioethics and attendant legal issues aside, it is striking how differently the 
distinction between persons and things is thought of in various cultural contexts. Bruno 
Latour has argued that this distinction is not only irrelevant in many parts of the world 
but also that it is improper to consider this as an exotic failure:  
the savages are not the ones who appear strange because they mix what should in 
no case be mixed, “things” and “persons”; we Westerners are the odd ones, we 
who have been living up to now in the strange belief that we had to separate 
“things” on the one hand and “persons” on the other into two distinct collectives, 
according to two incommensurable forms of collection.74 
Latour invites us to see that an awareness of the different cultural schemata that form 
the world is only a first step in a more thorough de-centering of the Western perspec-
tive. An example from the concrete legal world demonstrates that this distinction be-
tween person and things does not always work according to Western standards. What 
Alain Supiot labels as “irrational,” i.e., the treatment of things as persons, is for instance 
a common legal practice in Hindu culture. Divine idols are not regarded as things, as 
property that can be possessed and traded, but as legal persons who are endowed with 
rights, duties, and interests of their own, a conception that has often come into conflict 
with the implementation of British common law doctrines in India.75 More generally, 
and this will be shown in the last part of this article, the domain of property law is 
worthy of investigation, as it is infused with cultural conflicts that are to a large extent 
due to diverging conceptions of personhood and accountability in a non-penological 
sense.  
6_Person and Authorship — The Cultural Background of Intellectual Property  
The genesis of the Western concept of person shows how it rests upon the model of the 
sovereign, individual subject— not least through the aforementioned construction of 
non-persons.76 All attempts to disenchant this phantasm on the part of psychoanalysis, 
‘post-structuralism’ or biotechnology have not induced legal thinking to get rid of this 
conception; Sven Opitz has argued that, for systematic reasons, modern law has to stick 
to the liberal fiction of a legal subject that is capable of autonomous decisions for which 
it takes responsibility, because otherwise law would no longer be intelligible.77 As con-
vincing as this point is, it must be pointed out that from a comparative point of view 
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there are indeed other cultural conceptions of accountability and imputation that chal-
lenge this fiction. 
Cultural anthropologists like Clifford Geertz have therefore denied the universality 
of the Western version of personality for a long time: 
The Western concept of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated 
motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, 
judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both 
against other such wholes and against its social and natural background, is, how-
ever incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the 
world’s cultures.78  
In many parts of the world, a relational conception of personality prevails, according 
to which a person is thought of as a knot in a web of social relations, and not primarily 
as a clearly delimitable entity;79 consequently, anthropological research has discovered 
“dividualist” instead of “individualist” images of personhood in India and Melanesia.80 
These different notions of personhood collide dramatically in property and copyright 
law disagreements, and especially in intellectual property lawsuits. The central position 
that the concept of property occupies in Western legal thought goes back to Enlighten-
ment philosophy, where the traditional Roman law conceptions of property and of ius 
commune were infused with the pathos of freedom and autonomy.81 John Locke takes 
the subjective right to property to the extremes by claiming a natural right to property 
that comprises the person’s entire physical and mental sphere of freedom, namely 
“lives, liberties and estates,” for the security of which the citizens contractually unite.82 
Locke’s theorem that “man has a property in his own person”83 is related to his dubious 
theory of acquisition; this conception has often been criticized as “possessive individ-
ualism.”84 International copyright law has been shaped by such individualist accounts 
of personhood, which were then further enriched by the romantic fiction of an ingen-
ious and autonomous author. As Rosemary Coombe has underlined: 
Laws of copyright […] were developed to protect the expressive works of authors 
and artists — increasingly perceived in Romantic terms of individual genius und 
transcendent creativity — in the service of promoting universal progress in the 
arts and sciences. Copyright laws protect works, understood to embody the unique 
personality of their individual authors, and the expressive component of the orig-
inal is so venerated that even a reproduction or imitation of it is deemed a form of 
theft.85  
This concept of authorship is linked to a special idea of attributing ‘works’ of art or 
science to an individual person, and this practice directly contradicts the traditional 
conceptions of many indigenous communities. Hence, the strategy of pharmaceutical 
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corporations, scientific or cultural organizations to access and exploit the traditional 
knowledge of these communities has severe consequences,86 which are manifested in 
legal-cultural conflicts that reveal the particularity of the Western legal perspective 
with regard to personality, subjectivity, and individuality — the very foundations of 
the homo juridicus that Supiot describes. A short illustrative example may be in order. 
It is almost impossible to protect the comprehensive biological knowledge of the 
Kayapo tribe in Brazil by means of patent or copyright law, as this knowledge is not 
innovative but has been passed down through many generations. A single person can-
not be attributed as the source of this knowledge for two reasons: firstly, it is collective 
knowledge; secondly, it is a form of knowledge which is not of human origin but which 
emanates from nature itself.87 Conceptualizing the genesis of knowledge and, hence, 
authorship in way that recognizable by law can take highly divergent paths based on 
cultural variety.88  
For many years, Terri Janke has reported on similar problems of those indigenous 
communities in Australia that are fighting for the protection of their artworks. Classical 
copyright law fails to come to terms with traditional drawings, sculptures, and other 
cultural expressions that do not aim at originality, and the first material manifestations 
of which cannot be attributed to a single author. It is precisely the long history of these 
artworks that not only characterizes their need for protection but also impedes their 
actually being protected by applicable copyright law.89 Beyond those practical prob-
lems, a concept of authorship emerges that, once again, defies Western schemes of the 
individuality of legal personality through the emphasis on the priority of the commu-
nity: 
Indigenous knowledge is more often held for the benefit of a community or group 
as a whole not an individual creator and there can be strict protocols governing 
the use of Indigenous knowledge directed at gaining community approval. Indig-
enous artists and creators often feel uncomfortable about identifying as the “crea-
tor” of Indigenous knowledge, not wanting to undermine their community’s tra-
ditions and customs. A distinction exists, between their role as “artist” having the 
right to depict story in art form and the communal right of the clan group as the 
cultural owner.90 
By weighing author and personality rights against public interests, by separating ideas 
from their manifestations, and by distinguishing between material and immaterial 
works, copyright law misses the specific social embedding and function of traditional 
knowledge: 
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The law rips asunder what First Nations people view as integrally related, freezing 
into categories what Native Peoples find flowing in relationships that do not sep-
arate texts from ongoing creative production, or ongoing creativity from social 
relationships, or social relationships from people’s relationship to an ecological 
landscape that binds past and future generations in relations of spiritual signifi-
cance.91  
Yet it is not only Western law that disrupts holistic traditional notions of knowledge, 
but also social actors who try to exploit this knowledge for their individual or corporate 
artistic, scientific, economic or ecological interests.92 The often cosmological narrative 
framing of traditional knowledge is either misconceived or ignored by these actors. 
This explains why indigenous groups seek legal protection only partly for monetary 
reasons but also for fear of seeing the ritual and symbolic reproduction of their 
knowledge desacralized. The potential symbolic violation represents a far more dam-
aging experience than any material loss.93 
The attribution of traditional knowledge has motivated various proposals to reform 
the system of copyright law entirely. This, however, raises the question of to what de-
gree this system is able to adapt to the needs of indigenous groups without undermining 
its foundation as law.94 While the idea of recognizing collective or communal author-
ship is called for,95 it is also often discarded in order to establish a sui generis-protec-
tion,96 which might legally recognize the de-personification of knowledge production; 
suggestions go as far as making the traditional knowledge itself a legal subject, and 
therefore the bearer of fundamental rights.97  
While such struggles for recognition express highly divergent cultural views of the 
world, the cosmos, knowledge, and personality, legal and political efforts to cope with 
these conflicts also contribute to altering the cultural identities that are at stake. As 
championed by ethno-centrists as well as activists eager to enact legal change,98 cul-
tural incommensurability presumes the existence of immutable and clear-cut individual 
cultures. Thus, speaking in the name of culture always implies, voluntarily or not, the 
global claim to be able to speak for the ‘real’ essence and identity of a community. 
Such a performative depiction of a homogenous entity, however, contradicts an under-
standing of culture as an intellectually and practically reproduced system of significa-
tion that is open to interpretive struggle and re-signification.99 Accordingly, the politi-
cal dimension of ‘culture talk’ is marked by the will to closure for strategic reasons or 
due to ignorance.100 
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As the analysis above has demonstrated, law can be conceived of as a cultural tech-
nique that contributes not only to the fixation but also to the reformulation of subjec-
tivities and identities. Therefore, observing law as a cultural process permits one to 
grasp the manifold normative, narrative, organizational, epistemic and symbolic pre-
suppositions and effects of legal processes.101 Thereby the contingency and particular-
ity of legal forms and practices is revealed as well as the political struggles and violence 
that stand behind the self-proclaimed sobriety and rationality of law. 
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